



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

November 29, 2001

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

References:

a. Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning various dossiers. Your request was received in this office on April 18, 2001.

b. Our letter of April 20, 2001, informing you that additional time was needed to review the records and we were unable to comply to the 20-day statutory time limit in processing your requests.

We have conducted checks of the automated Defense Clearance and Investigations Index and a search of the Investigative Records Repository to determine the existence of Army intelligence investigative records responsive to your request. The records are enclosed for your use.

We have located the enclosed records pertaining to Soviet Activities in Mexico, ZF010343W. We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958. As a result of our review, information has been sanitized and four pages are denied in their entirety as the information is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.3(a)(2), 1.3(a)(3), 3.4(b)(1) and 3.4(b)(6) of EO 12958. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552(b)(1). It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release. Fees for processing this request are waived. A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.3(a)(2) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.3(a)(3) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Section 3.4(b)(1) of EO 12958 provides that classified information more than 25 years old is exempt from automatic declassification if it would reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or method, or reveal the identity of a human intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of that source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national security interests of the United States.

Section 3.4(b)(6) of EO 12958 provides that classified information more than 25 years old is exempt from automatic declassification if it would reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair relations between the United States and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States.

Since the release of the information deleted from these records would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned, this information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA per Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(6).

In addition, information has been sanitized from the records and two pages of the same pages withheld under (b)(1) are also denied in their entirety as the release of the information would reveal the identity of confidential sources and sensitive intelligence methods. This information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(D) and (b)(7)(E) of the FOIA. The significant and legitimate governmental purpose to be served by withholding is that a viable and effective intelligence investigative capability is dependent upon protection of confidential sources and sensitive investigative methodologies.

The withholding of information by this office is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Brigadier General Keith B. Alexander, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You may appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 60 day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you filing litigation in the courts.

Coordination has been completed and we have been informed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that information has been sanitized from the records and 71 pages are denied in their entirety pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3). It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release.

The withholding of the information by the CIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision to the Agency Review Panel within 45 days from the date of this letter. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the following: Ms. Kathryn I. Dyer, Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC 20505. Please explain the basis of your appeal. Cite CIA F-1998-00869 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

We have also been informed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that information has been sanitized and four pages are denied in their entirety pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(7)(C) of the FOIA. It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release.

The withholding of the information by the FBI constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be sent to the Co-Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice, Flag Building, Suite 570, Washington, DC 20530-0001 within 60 days from the date of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal". Please cite FBI/PA #435213-1 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

Coordination has also been completed and we have been informed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that information has been sanitized and 32 pages are denied in their entirety pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) of the FOIA. It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release.

The withholding of the information by the DIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision directly to the DIA. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, ATTN: SVI-1-FOIA, Washington, DC 20340-5100. Please cite DIA #0346-98 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.


During the processing of your request, information was disclosed which is under the purview of other government agencies. This office has no authority to release these records and they are being referred, along with your request, for appropriate action under the FOIA, and direct reply to you.

We are coordinating with other government agencies concerning the releasability of their information contained in the records. We will inform you as to the releasability of the information upon completion of our coordination.

We are continuing to review records regarding other titles you have requested and will respond to you by separate correspondence when our review is complete.

If you have any questions concerning this action, feel free to contact Mrs. Reilly at (301) 677-4742. Please refer case #851F-01.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Russell A. Nichols".

Russell A. Nichols
Chief, Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Enclosure

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

DOSSIER NO. ZF 010343W

As of 26 Sept 79 all material included
(Date)
in this file conforms with DA policies currently
in effect.

Jacqueline Lewis 26 Sept 79
(Signature) (Date Signed)
Suspect in Lewis C55
(Printed Name) (Grade)

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA

JP AR 381-10

REVIEWER... [Signature]

DATE 27 Oct 79

REVIEWED BY ARCHIST
DATE 8 FEB 1980

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA

JP AR 381-10

REVIEWER... [Signature]

DATE 10 Oct 80

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Sing Sing Bird
Intell det. in Mexico*

SEP 1 1961

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Sino-Soviet Mexico Based Operations (U)

1219472

THRU: Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
United States Continental Army Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
Fourth United States Army
Fort Sam Houston, Texas

Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
Sixth United States Army
Presidio of San Francisco, California

1. (U) Reference ACSI-SC letter, dated 10 May 1961, subject: "Aggressive Counterintelligence (U)."

2. (C) In view of the staff size of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, plus official Cuban representation and their activities, this office must assume that the Cuban Intelligence Services are an integral part of Sino-Soviet Bloc Intelligence efforts in Mexico.

3. (C) Recent reports indicate increasing Cuban potential for both the conduct and/or support of intelligence operations emanating from Mexico. This potential is predicated upon the following:

a. The presence of known Soviet intelligence operatives in Cuba, presumed to be functioning as advisors.

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ON MAR 4 1996
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOIPO
Auth Para 1.603 DoD 5200.1-R

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RECORD SECTION COPY
DATE 10/1/61 BY

342C Sharp

910.1 Cuban War

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Sino-Soviet Mexican Based Operations (U)

b. Mexico has long been a trans-shipment point for Cuban propaganda. The recipients have all had a long history of Communist affiliations and sympathies, if not actually maintaining Communist Party membership. Such experienced militants constitute a potential intelligence operations support group.

c. Agencia Informativa Latinoamericana, S.A., (Proma Latina - Cuban wire service) offices exist throughout Mexico, affording ideal agent cover.

d. Pre-Castro groups and front groups are widespread throughout a revolutionary-sympathetic Mexico, providing a generous source for agent recruitments.

e. The Cuban refugee flow to Mexico provides cover and a means of transportation for possible illegals.

f. Fishing boats from the Northeast coastal villages of the Yucatan Peninsula allegedly rendezvous with Cuban fishing vessels on the high seas for the purpose of transporting Cuban refugees. The Isla Mujeres which lies off the Yucatan at the point nearest Cuba has frequent small craft visitations. In the last 10 months, it has been alleged that at least 26 vessels have set forth at night to meet Cuban boats engaged in arms smuggling.

g. The Cuban Foreign Ministry intends to establish a Consulate in every state in Mexico. The most recently established is the Cuban Consulate in Merida. (There has been no consulate in Merida since late fall 1959.)

h. It has been reported that U.S. visas are counterfeited in Cuba, for the years preceding 1958. Apparently, the alleged forger has a seal for the year 1957, and cannot document any passport that was not issued by the Cuban Ministry of State since the name was changed in 1958 to the Ministry of Exterior. A passport issued by the Batista government could successfully establish Cuban Intelligence Service agents as anti-Castro refugees.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACSLSC

SUBJECT: Sino-Soviet Mexico Based Operations (U)

4. (U) Reporting of Cuban activities should commence as outlined in above reference.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

Copy furnished:
USARMA, Mexico City, Mexico

(Sgd) EDWARD S. MEHOSKY
Lt Colonel, GS

for
CLAUDE D. BARTON
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

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3

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ON MAR 4 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM EOP/20
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.2-R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr Blum/alt/73957

IAS/CI Br/Sec Div

ACSI-SC

MEMO FOR RECORD: (25 August 1961) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Sino/Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations (U)

CURRENT: Inst ltr informs G2's USARSIX and USARFOUR of various indications of Cuban Intelligence activities in Mexico.

BACKGROUND: CIAS Project 65 and CIAS project 79 concern Sino/Soviet Bloc third-country operations directed against the United States. Inst ltr provides rationale for including CIS as a Sino/Soviet Bloc member for purposes of counter-intelligence.

Cuban Intelligence Service

STATUS: Continuing.

RATIONALE: CIAS Projects 65 and 79.

DELAY: None.

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None.

COORDINATION: None required.

Action Officer Time: 2 hr

Typist Time: 2½ hr

Action Officer	<i>Edward A. Bittig</i>
Ch. CIAS	<i>Sanford L. Galt</i>
Chief, CI Br	<i>W. J. Kelly</i>
Ch. Sec Div	<i>Ernest L. Galt</i>

005

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ON MAR 4 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM F022
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1

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Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

b1 + b3 CIA

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s)

6-74

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JUL 28 1965

ACSI-SC

AUG 21 1961

SUBJECT: Sino/Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations (U)

1213040

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
Sixth United States Army
Presidio of San Francisco, California

Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
Fourth United States Army
Fort Sam Houston, Texas

1. (U) Reference ACSI-SC letter dated 10 May 1961, subject: Aggressive Counterintelligence (U), (TAB E).

2. (U)

3. (U)

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b. [

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(b)(3)
CIA

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ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Sino/Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations (U)

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FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

15/
JACK L. WEIGAND, Col, GS
Acting Chief, Security Division

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ON MAR 4 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 1.603 DoD 5200.1R

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ON 4 MAY 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R

2

ACSI-SC

MEMO FOR RECORD: (16 August 1961) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Sino/Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations (U)

CURRENT: Inst ltr informs G2, USARSIX & G2, USARFOUR of impending establishment of

STATUS: Continuing.

RATIONALE: CIAS Projects 79 and 65.

DELAY: None.

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None.

COORDINATION: None.

Action Officer Time: 1 hr

Typist Time: 2 hr

Action Officer	<i>[Signature]</i>
Ch, CIAS	<i>[Signature]</i>
Chief, CI Br	<i>[Signature]</i>
Ch, Sec Div	<i>[Signature]</i>

079

JUL 28 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEB 10 1961

ACSI-SL

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
Sixth United States Army
Presidio of San Francisco
California

1213600

Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
Fourth United States Army
Fort Sam Houston, Texas

1. (U) On 17 January 1961, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in El Paso, Texas, was given the following information by a reliable source:

a. On 16 January 1961, twenty-five persons met in Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico, to form the Friends of Cuba Committee. The meeting was presided over by Salvador NAVAR Alarcon, Communist Party of Mexico (PCM) member. Six PCM members were elected to positions on the three commissions which will run the committee: i.e., Political, Financial and Organization, and Propaganda Commissions.

b. The Friends of Cuba Committee has been instructed by the PCM Central Committee to send communications to all types of groups and institutes in Mexico asking for support of the Cuban revolution against US intervention. The instructions emphasized the need for public meetings and all types of propaganda.

2. (U) On 18 January 1961, another FBI source confirmed the formation and composition of the Friends of Cuba Committee in Juarez. This source further stated that Federico RUIZ, PCM organizer for the State of Chihuahua, was the bearer of the instructions from the PCM Central Committee to NAVAR.

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ON 2 Mar 99
BY CDR UCANSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

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RECORD SECTION COPY
Counterintelligence Br

1465) AC31

910.1 Eastern Europe

10 Jan 61

10 Jan 61

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (U)

3. (U) Records of ACSI do not contain any further information on these activities or personalities which is not already in your possession.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

SIGNED

CLAUDE D. BARTON

Colonel, GS

Chief, Security Division

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ON 2 Mar 98
BY CDR USN/COM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REF ID: A66739
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wt. Waco/cet/73957/r-AS/CI Br/Sec Div

ACSI-SC

MEMO FOR RECORD: (6 Feb 61)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (U)

CURRENT: [Inst ltr forwards contents of FBI report to ACoS, G2 Fourth and Sixth US Armies. Report concerns formation of Friends of Cuba Committee in Juarez, Mexico, upon orders of Central Committee of the PCM.]

BACKGROUND: [Report of FBI Office, El Paso, Texas, forwarded to ACSI for info on 26 January 1961.] Report received at CIAS on 31 Jan 61. CIAS responsible for keeping Fourth and Sixth US Armies informed on developments re subject received from other agencies.

STATUS: Continuing, Project 7E.

RATIONALE: To keep ACoS, G2, Fourth and Sixth US Armies, informed of PCM activities which could have a bearing on subject.

DELAY: None.

RECORD SECTION MATERIAL: None required.

COORDINATION: None required.

Action Officer Time: 2 hr
Typist Time: 2 hr

Action Officer:	<i>B. L. Wood</i>
Mr. CIAS:	<i>Lyndale L. L. L.</i>
Chief, CI Br:	<i>Therese L. L.</i>
Ch:	<i>A. B. L.</i>

082

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ON *Mar 99*
BY *ONE L. L. L. L. L.* FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-003 DoD 5200.1-R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Mr Wood/slc. 3957/CIAS, CI Br, Sec Div

DEC 9 1960

ACSI-SC

JUL 28 1965

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (U)

THRU: Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
United States Continental Army Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
Fourth United States Army
Fort Sam Houston, Texas

1211945

Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
Sixth United States Army
Presidio of San Francisco, California

1211945

1. (S) The following information pertinent to subject area of activity is forwarded for your information:

—s.(E

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
CIA

Red from
MVRB
14 Dec 60
JS

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN

NATIONALS

BY AUTHORITY OF

DATE 8 Dec 60

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SECTION COPY

~~SECRET~~

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (U)

b. [

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
CIA

]

c. [] was born about 1934 in []
[] He resides at Morelos 37, Tamaulapa. He is a member of the Communist Youth of Mexico, the youth section of the Communist Party of Mexico. In June 1960 [] allegedly was selected to take training in the USSR with an ultimate aim of disrupting the activities of the US Project Mercury Station in Guaymas, Sonora, Mexico. In August 1960 [] attended the First Latin American Youth Congress in Havana, Cuba. Since his return there has been no further talk of his going to the USSR. [] continues to be active in PCM propaganda activities. (FBI Report, Res [] 6 August 1960, UNCLASSIFIED).

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(C)
FBI

d. [

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
CIA

]

2. (U) Your office will be furnished any additional information received relative to the above activities and personalities.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

Sgd DARREL G. COSTELLO
Lt Colonel, GS

For CLAUDE D. BARTON
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

084

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wood/slc/739 CIAS, CI Br, Sec Div

ACSI-SC

MEMO FOR RECORD: (8 Dec 60)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (U)

CURRENT: Inst ltr fwds info received from other agencies to ACoS, G2 Fourth and Sixth US Armies for information. Distribution of this material has been made to USARMA Mexico by source agencies.

BACKGROUND: Fourth and Sixth US Armies have current specific interest in subject.

STATUS: Continuing (Project 79)

RATIONALE: To keep Fourth and Sixth Armies informed of significant info re subject.

DELAY: Reports are forwarded periodically

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None

COORDINATION: None required.

Action Officer Time: 6 hr

Typist Time: 2 hr

Action Officer	<i>[Signature]</i>
Ch. CI	<i>[Signature]</i>
Ch. CI Br	<i>[Signature]</i>
Ch. Sec Div	<i>[Signature]</i>

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED --
ON 2 Mar 98
BY CDRL J. J. GOM FOM/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

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CIA

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70) (8)

Lt Col Molmen/78874/asc

710.1 Eastern Culture

JACK L. WEIGAND, Col, GS
Chief, Counterintelligence Branch

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

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Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

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Page(s) 87-91

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JUL 28 1965

NOV 10 1960

ACJL-JC

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
Fourth United States Army
Fort Sam Houston, Texas

121115^r

Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
Sixth United States Army
Presidio of San Francisco, California

121115^r

1. (s) The following information pertinent to subject area of activity is forwarded for your information. This information was obtained from other national agencies.

a. [

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CIA

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ACSI-5C

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (U)

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ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (C)

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(b)(3)
CIA

h. The Juventud Comunista de Mexico (JCM—Communist Youth of Mexico) has its headquarters at Calle Mar Egea 154, Toluca, Mexico City. The JCM, formerly using this address, now is located at Calle Vulcanizacion 203, Colonia 20 de Noviembre, Mexico City. On 5 September 1960, the JCM appointed a Provisional Committee to direct the activities of the organization. This committee will be replaced by a National Committee when a National Congress is held. The members of the committee are: Alberto SALINAS, Armando MARTINEZ Verdugo, Horacio TIRAN, Tonyo CILAYA, Guillermo ALDANA, Evarado JIMENEZ, Armando ORTIVERO, Amador JIMENEZ, Zoyto RAMIREZ, and Mauricio CASTILLO. The JCM participated in demonstrations connected with the National Teachers Union strike in June and July 1960 and organized a guard for the National Teachers school. It also provided a guard for the First National Congress for the Liberation of Political Prisoners and the Defense of Constitutional Guarantees which was held in Mexico City in July 1960. The JCM also took part in the student demonstration of 12 July 1960 in front of the US Embassy in Mexico City. An attempt was made during the demonstration to burn a US flag but police intervention prevented this. The action was led by Leonel PADILLA and Antonio TENORIO Adams with Carlos ORTIZ Tejeda attempting to burn the flag. The JCM has been active in propaganda and demonstrations in favor of the principles of the Cuban revolution. In August 1960, names of JCM members who might be interested in taking a course in guerrilla warfare in Cuba being given.

~~SECRET~~

ACU-5C

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-Based Operations Against the Southwest US (C)

Colonel Alberto BAYO and Ernesto "Che" GUEVARA were collected. Manuel ONTIVERO and Augusto SALINAS are particularly active in organization of these activities. Only lack of funds prevented the LCU from carrying out an intensive anti-American propaganda campaign during the celebration of the 150th anniversary of Mexican Independence. The JCU sent an official ten man delegation to attend the First Latin American Youth Congress in Havana, Cuba, two members of this delegation remained in Cuba to become members of the International Militia. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Letter Report re: Communist Youth of Mexico, Washington D.C., undated, UNCLASSIFIED)

i. E

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
CIA

i. E

REFERRED

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AC 31-2C
SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc / Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (C)

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ACSI-X

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest L- (U)

(b)(1)
FBI

[

2. (S)(u) Your office will be furnished any additional information received relative to the above activities and personalities.

]

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

for J. B. Conny, Jr. Lt Col b.s.
MORRIS B. MONTGOMERY
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

097

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr Woot/gra/CIAS/X73957

ACSI-SC

MEMO FOR RECORD: (8 November 1960)

(u)
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US. (U)

CURRENT: Inst letter forwards info received from other agencies to ACofS, G2, Fourth US Army and Sixth US Army for information. Distribution of this material has been made to USARMA, Mexico by source agencies.

BACKGROUND: Fourth and Sixth US Armies' current, specific interest in subject.

STATUS: Continuing, Project 79.

RATIONALE: To keep Fourth and Sixth Armies informed of significant info re subject.

DELAY: Reports are forwarded periodically.

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None.

COORDINATION: None required.

Action Officer Time: 8 hrs
Typist Time: 5 hrs

Action Officer	<i>[Signature]</i>
Ch, Sec Div	<i>[Signature]</i>

098

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Mar 98
BY CEE/ST/SC/FOI/PO
AUTH FARMY CDD EOL 0200.1-R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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JUL 28 1965

~~SECRET~~

ACSI-SC
Exec, OACSI

Information Book Item for ACSI Trip to Mexico (U)
DSMCI

17 OCT 1960
Mr Wood/slc/73957

(U)

1. (U) Reference 5 Oct 60 ACSI/Executive request for up-dating subject Information Book Items; and ACSI-SC DF, above subject, dated 29 July 1960.

2. (U) Forwarded are five revised IBI's on:

- a. Communist Subversive Activities in Mexico
- b. The Soviet/Satellite Espionage Threat in Mexico
- c. Cuban Subversive Efforts in Mexico
- d. Capabilities and Attitudes of the Mexican Security Agencies
- e. US Army CI Operations involving Mexico

3. (U) Recommend that none of these items be physically carried outside US territory.

(Sgd) C. F. Leonard, Jr.

5 Incl
as

C. F. LEONARD, JR.
Brigadier General, GS
Director of Security Planning
and Combat Intelligence

910.1
Eastern Europe

11 Oct 60

(1 page)

099

Recd
Ext
7 Nov 60
mxc

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS EXCEPT
BY AUTHORITY OF *None*
DATE *11 Oct 1960*
RELIES TO INCLOSURES ONLY

~~SECRET~~
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED when
separated from classified
inclosures.

RECORD SECTION C
Counterintelligence

ACSI-SC

MEMO FOR RECORD: (11 October 1960)

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Information Book Items for ACSI Trip to Mexico (U)

CURRENT: Instant action brings up to date IBI's prepared 29 July 1960 on Communist Subversive Activities, Soviet/Satellite Espionage Threat, Cuban Subversive Efforts In Mexico, Capabilities and Attitudes of Mexican Security Agencies, and US Army CI Operations Involving Mexico.

BACKGROUND: Items were originally prepared in July 1960. ACSI to make Mexican trip from 8-15 November 1960. Revision requested by ACSI/Executive, 5 Oct 60.

STATUS: Closed

RATIONALE: Inst IBI's supply ACSI with latest info on Subject activities.

DELAY: None

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None

COORDINATION: For concurrence by Western Division, WH Section of Section 1, WH
12 Oct 60. *on CI Operations not requiring concurrence.*

Action Officer Time: 10 hrs
Typist Time: 8 hrs

Action Officer Stoske J. De W...

Ch, CIAS [Signature]

Chief, CI Br [Signature]

Ch, Sec Div [Signature]

~~SECRET~~

Security Division, CI Br (CIAS)
Mr. Wood x73957

11 October 1960

028 ✓
142 ✓
SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

1. (U) References: State, CIA and FBI classified reports.
2. (U) Problems: Communist subversive activities in Mexico.
3. (S) ^(u) Discussion:

a. Mexican Communist activities have been centered in the efforts of three legal parties and numerous front groups. The Mexican Communist Party (PCM) is small (estimated at less than 5,000 members) and has been troubled by internal tensions and dissensions. Following labor and student disturbances in the spring and summer of 1959, Mexican security authorities closed down the PCM headquarters in Mexico City and started a roundup of Communist leaders who had gone into hiding. They arrested and imprisoned General Dionisio ENCINNA Rodriguez who had been dictator of the PCM for 19 years. Following further student unrest in the summer of 1960, ENCINNA's successor, David SANCHEZ Alfaro, was also arrested on 10 August 1960 and imprisoned. Mexican security authorities have placed PCM leaders under close surveillance and have strengthened measures to prevent printing of PCM propaganda. As a result, the party is demoralized and is experiencing financial difficulties. It is afraid to hold public meetings or collect dues.

b. A splinter party, the Mexican Workers and Farmers Party (POCM) has about 1000 members. Since early 1957, acting under Soviet instructions, the leaders of the POCM have been attempting to achieve unity with the PCM. In May 1960 the POCM accepted a PCM Executive Board proposal to dissolve the POCM and to have individual members seek PCM membership. The decision has had slight effect. Factions within the POCM seek mass union with the PCM and refuse to deactivate as a party. Further opposition to the trend towards unity is manifested by the organizational activities of a number of Marxist lawyers (advisors to labor groups), aimed at formation of a new party, the Party of the Workers Class of Mexico (PCOM). This party is to have its strength among railroad and petroleum industry workers and is to be an "educated Marxist-Leninist" party.

c. A Marxist party, formerly known as the Popular Party (PP) but redesignated on 28 August 1960 as the Popular Socialist Party (PSF), is in effect a Communist political front with the same subversive objectives as the

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BY AUTHORITY OF

DATE 11 OCT 1960

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ON 4 MAY 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

PCM and the PDCM, and is equally pro-Soviet. The PSP is headed by the crypto-Communist, Vincente LOMBARDO Toledano, who claims to have received orders in Moscow during March 1959 to assume the dominant role in leftist activities in Mexico. PSP membership is approximately 25,000.

d. Since initiation of the clamp-down in the summer of 1959, Communist Party front activities, have been limited almost exclusively to predictable propaganda: Pro-peace, anti-US Imperialism, and in favor of the Cuban revolution. Agitational activities have concentrated on student-teacher and intellectual circles. One phase of the campaign is targeted against the location of a US satellite tracking station on Mexican soil.

e. The location of a major Soviet diplomatic representation and a number of other Sino/Soviet Bloc missions in Mexico have enabled International Communist leadership to use Mexico as a base for subversive and espionage efforts throughout the Central American and Caribbean areas. Increasing Bloc influence in Cuba and a continuation of the Mexican security action against the PCM may cause the transfer of some of these activities to Havana. Soviet preparations for such a transfer may be indicated by the appointment of experienced intelligence personnel to the Embassy in Cuba. Further, there is increased emphasis by the World Federation of Trade Unions on the Cuban Confederation of Workers (CTC) at the expense of the Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL) headed by LOMBARDO Toledano.

(U)
4. (S) Conclusions: Soviet Instructions, during the spring of 1959, that Mexican Communist leaders eliminate dissensions and promote unity of the Marxist parties of Mexico are clearly a part of the long-range program for Latin America announced at the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. There will be a strong effort to expand the strength and influence of local Communism in Mexico. This will be attained by taking advantage of the "extreme leftist" character of the LOPEZ Mateos government and the advantageous position of Cuba as a base and cover for operations. While Havana may be expected to become the principal base for International Communist guidance and support in Latin America, Communist advantages and organizations in Mexico will not be abandoned. Despite its leftist orientation, the Mexican government is expected to react to these threats to its security with a program of stricter countermeasures.]

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2

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ON 4 MAY 2000
BY USAINSCOM POL/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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Security Division, CI Br (CIAS)
Mr Wood x73957

11 October 1960

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T
SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

1. (U) State, CIA, FBI, USARMA and CIC classified reporting.
2. ~~(S)~~^(U) Problems: Soviet/Satellite espionage threat in Mexico.
3. ~~(S)~~^(U) Discussion:

a. The large Soviet Bloc diplomatic representation in Mexico constitutes a threat to the security of Latin America and the US Army, particularly to the Fourth and Sixth US Army areas. Bloc diplomatic missions are staffed in excess of the legitimate needs presented by Bloc political and economic activities in Mexico. Bloc missions include the USSR Embassy (47 diplomats and employees), the Czechoslovakian Legation (25 diplomats and employees), and the Polish Legation (20 diplomats and employees). Soviet Bloc personnel in Mexico are known to conduct propaganda and espionage activities under diplomatic cover.

b. Soviet Bloc representatives maintain overt contact with Mexican and foreign Communists through various front organizations, such as friendship societies. Clandestine contacts are also maintained with official Communist Party liaison representatives, intelligence agents and members of foreign Communist Parties resident in or transient through Mexico.

c. The following Bloc diplomatic personnel are reportedly involved in espionage operations directed against targets in the United States:

(1) Colonel Sergio F SOKOLOVSKY, Assistant Military and Naval Attache.

(2) Colonel Dmitri N KUZNETZOV, Assistant Military and Naval Attache.

(3) Lt Colonel Yuri CHELPANOV, Second Assistant Military Attache.

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
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BY AUTHORITY OF 11 Oct 1960
DATE 11 Oct 1960

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ON 4 MAY 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

- (4) Valentin Vasilyevich BAKULIN, Military Attache.
- (5) Pavel Federovich KOVALEV, employee in the offices of the Soviet attaches.
- (6) Yevgeni Grigorovich LAPSHEV, employee in Soviet Commercial Section.
- (7) Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV, Attache and Consul.
- (8) Grigori Nikandrovich YEFREMOV, officially chauffeur for the Office of the Soviet Attaches but actually an intelligence officer.
- (9) Vladimir Vasilyevich NOVIKOV, Second Secretary of the Embassy.
- (10) Gennadii Vasilyevich KUZNETSOV, employee in the office of the Soviet Attaches.
- (11) Tadysz ZIOLOWSKI, Attache in the Polish Legation.
- (12) Ladislav KACHTIK, Czechoslovakian intelligence agent.
- (13) Vaclav KUBATA, Czechoslovakian Consul in Monterrey, Mexico.

d. The following factors favor the conduct of Soviet Bloc operations in Mexico targeted against the US:

- (1) The large concentration of key military installations and industrial facilities in the Southwest US which are readily accessible from the 1500 mile Mexican-US border.
- (2) The existence of approximately 175 facilities in Northern Mexico which can handle aircraft capable of providing alternate routes into the Southwest US.
- (3) The magnitude of traffic across the Mexican-US border (estimated by INS to have been 96 million crossings in 1958, of which 55 million were aliens) which provides a fruitful field for Soviet planting of agents.

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ON 4 MAY 2000
BY USAINSCOM POI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

(4) The leftist orientation of a great portion of the Mexican population and the consequent residence of Communists and sympathizers on the large ranches in Northern Mexico. These persons provide rendezvous points for Soviet agents. The largest concentration of such personnel is in Baja California.

4. (S) ^(u) Conclusions: The extraordinary number of Soviet/Satellite diplomatic representatives in Mexico and the activities of the three Communist oriented parties of Mexico present a threat to the security of US Army installations in the Southwest US. US Army's aggressive counterintelligence program, in coordination with other US intelligence agencies in the Mexico area, should minimize this threat.

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ON 4 MAY 2000
BY USAINSCOM POL/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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Security Division, CI Er (CIAS)
Mr Wood 73957

11 October 1960

628
6742
SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

1. (U) References: CIA, State, FBI and CIC classified reporting.
2. (U) Problem: Cuban subversive efforts in Mexico.
3. (S) ^(u) Discussions:

a. The Cuban Embassy in Mexico City is considered to be a center for Cuban espionage and subversion in Mexico and the adjoining Central American countries. The Cuban Ambassador, Antonio PORTUONDO Valor, is a former member of the Communist Party. The principal Cuban Intelligence agents in Mexico are Embassy Attache Augustin ALDAMA Acosta assisted by Cuban Military Attache Lt Hector GARCIA Vidal. ALDAMA maintains almost daily contact with Favel Antorovich YATSKOV, Attache and Consul of the USSR Embassy in Mexico who is known to be engaged in intelligence activities.

b. The extent and details of Cuban intelligence activities in Mexico are not known. Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico City have attempted to embarrass the US Embassy through provocations, such as a feigned defection of GARCIA. Traces have been uncovered of Cuban operations in Northern Mexico targeted against US targets. It has been alleged that some of the illegal border crossings into the US attempted by Cuban exiles have actually been part of Cuban intelligence operations. The investigation, penetration and neutralization of anti-Castro exile groups account for a great proportion of the activities of Cuban intelligence.

c. The political subversive efforts of the Cuban embassy include propaganda for the "Ideals of the Cuban revolution" and against "North American Imperialism" and the organization of delegations to attend congresses in Cuba. It also supports (including, allegedly, arms) revolutionary movements in Mexico. These movements are of Mexican, Honduran, Nicaraguan, Panamanian and Guatemalan national origin. Use of Mexico for a base permits Cuba to disclaim responsibility for these revolutionary activities.

d. In addition to requesting the recall of the former Cuban Ambassador under threat of declaring him persona non grata, the Mexican authorities have arrested and deported individuals connected with Cuban anti-exile, youth and revolutionary support groups. Mexican authorities are also keeping a close watch on the activities of the Cuban news agency, Prensa Latina. In spite of the sympathies of the Mexican government with certain aims of the Cuban revolution, such as land reform and economic reorganization, there is no indication that Mexican Security Authorities intend to ignore the threat posed by Cuban operations in Mexico.

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BY AUTHORITY OF his name
DATE 11 Oct 1960

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ON 4 MAY 2000
BY USAINSCOM POLPA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

4. (S) ^(U) Conclusion: With Soviet support and guidance firmly established in both Havana and Mexico City, Cuban/Mexican-based espionage and subversion operations can be expected to improve in quality. It is believed that Mexican Security Agencies, although handicapped by limited capabilities and the leftist nature of the LOPEZ Mateo regime, will seek more effectively to counter Cuban clandestine activities.

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 4 MAY 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOL/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

11 October 1960

*G28
742*
SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

1. (U) References: CIA, State, USARMA classified reporting and intelligence reference materials.

2. (U) Problems: Capabilities and Attitudes of Mexican Security Agencies with respect to Communist or other anti-US elements.

3. (S) Discussions:

a. The following six organizations comprise the major elements of the Mexican Security Agencies:

(1) Second Section, Presidential General Staff, providing physical security for the President of Mexico.

(2) Second Section, Army General Staff, providing foreign and domestic intelligence for the Mexican Army and Air Force.

(3) Second Section, Naval General Staff, providing foreign and domestic intelligence for the Mexican Navy.

(4) Second Section, Air Force General Staff, dependent upon the Second Section, Army General Staff, for the collection of foreign and domestic intelligence.

(5) Federal Security Police, responsible for law enforcement. Its functions are similar to the US FBI.

(6) National Police, providing normal police functions.

b. Personnel of the Mexican Security Agencies are known to be susceptible to bribery and graft. They are handicapped by an attitude of indifference towards their responsibilities. Despite these adverse conditions, the agencies perform creditably, particularly in those instances where immediate interests of the President or other high-ranking officials are involved. Corrupt influences are more common and powerful at the lower echelons of the police agencies.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN

NATIONALS EXCEPT *None*

BY AUTHORITY OF *None*

DATE *11 Oct 1960*

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON *4 MAY 2000*
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

c. The Second Section, Mexican Army, Army General Staff, Secretariat of National Defense, is under the leadership of Colonel Arturo CORONA Medloroz, a graduate of the US Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. During the past year, this agency has shown an ever increasing awareness of the threats posed by International Communist activities generated by Soviet/Satellite personnel in Mexico. Motivated by the expulsion of Bloc representatives for taking part in the railroad strike of March 1959, the Second Section initiated a program to control the travel of Soviet attache personnel in Mexico and to conduct surveillances of their activities. Baja California has been declared off-limits to these personnel. Their travel to any area adjacent to the US border is subject to strict control. The program is severely handicapped by a lack of trained counterintelligence personnel. Intelligence headquarters of the major commands are manned by line officers with no training or experience in intelligence. One Mexican officer graduated from the US Army Intelligence Course, Fort Gulick, Canal Zone (USARCAIRB) will be used to organize a counterintelligence section in the Defense Secretariat. The Second Section hopes to take further advantage of this training opportunity. As a stop gap measure, many counterintelligence missions are entrusted to Reserve Officers holding command positions in the normal police security agencies.

d. Although a few Communists and sympathizers have obtained positions in other governmental agencies none is known to hold an important position in the security agencies. Colonel Rangel ESCAMILLA, Director of the Federal Security Police, has indicated that his organization is totally anti-Communist. He has also expressed the hope of continued close cooperation between his organization and the US to combat the common menace of International Communism. Colonel CORONA also expressed himself in a like manner.

e. There is little specific information available regarding the National Police attitude towards the US. Measures taken by that organization in cooperation with the Federal Security Police have effectively paralyzed the activities of the Communist Party of Mexico. This effectiveness may be considered indicative of anti-Communist convictions. The Mexican Navy is the only service which does not openly prefer American to Soviet attache personnel.

SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

4. (S) (u) Conclusions: Mexican Security Agencies, in particular the Army Second Section and the Federal Security Police, are becoming increasingly aware of the threats posed by International Communism. Within the limits of their capabilities, they are attempting to counter these threats. Lack of sufficiently trained personnel is the greatest weakness of the agencies. They are seeking and receiving US assistance to correct this and other deficiencies. No Mexican Security Agency is known to be significantly penetrated by Communist agents. The only agency not actively exhibiting anti-Soviet tendencies is the Mexican Navy wherein Soviet influence is not believed to be strong.]

110

3

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 4 MAY 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

Security Division, CI Branch
Lt Col Molmen X56074
13 October 1960

SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

1. ~~_____~~ Problem: L
2. ~~_____~~ Discussion:

5-150552 (b) (1)

3. ~~_____~~ Status:

An interim directive has been implemented which requires the 902d CIC Group to continue these operations through the temporary attachment of those 4th and 6th Army personnel who were engaged in this program prior to the 31 March 1960. []

A request for a personnel augmentation of ten spaces for the 902d CIC Group to conduct these operations has been submitted to O&T Division. Once the problem of funds and personnel has been satisfactorily resolved and formal coordination with () is effected, a final operational plan will be implemented to fulfill the purpose of this program.

4. Recommendation:

That the ARMA, Mexico be made aware of the status of this operation.

RECORD SECTION COPY
Counterintelligence Br

427
p43

~~SECRET~~

ACSI

ACSI-SC
Ch, Scty Div

Operation 10324 (U)
Ch, CI Branch

SECRET
Lt Col [] 56074/30

The attached comment #4 is provided for your information and approval prior to its being forwarded to Investigations Branch.

1 Incl
Cmt #4 w/1 incl

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

APPROVED _____

DISAPPROVED _____

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 May 98
BY CDR [] /PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

Rec'd ASB
20 Sept 60
file

RECORD SECTION

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Declassified when
information from classified

898-c4884 1/22C Singapore

910.1 Eastern Europe

10 Sept 60

CI 7 Nov 60

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5 USC 552 (b) (6)

ACSI-SC (25 August 1960)
SUBJECT: Operation 10324 (U)

TO: Ch, Investigations
Branch

FROM: Ch, CIB

DATE:

Lt Col []

56074/jo

COMMENT # 4

1. (U) References: Security Div IF, dtd 8 March 1960, Subject: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Espionage Operations (U).

2. (U) The plan of action outlined in Comment 2, above, has been reviewed and is approved with the following exceptions:

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (E)

a. []

b. Costs. The estimated cost figure of \$18,500.00 for the first year of operation appears excessive. A maximum of \$3,000, in addition to Army pay and allowances, appears adequate. It is therefore requested that this item be reviewed and justified.

c. Target date. Since planning for this operation was initiated in March 1960, a March 1961 target date seems unduly long. In addition, since only [] rather than a [] is considered necessary, the target date can be further accelerated. A [] date or earlier appears appropriate.

3. (U) Subject to the above exceptions, the plan of action is approved. It is again noted that the individual selected is to be []

JACK L. WEIGAND, Lt Col, GS
Chief, Counterintelligence Branch

1 Incl
mc

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Mar 98
BY CDR USA/INCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

898-64884

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5 USC 552 (b) (6)
5 USC 552a (n) (7) (F)
5 USC 552 (b) (1)

ACSI-SC/Lt Col [] 56074/jo

MEMO FOR RECORD: (u) (12 Sep 60)

CURRENT: Investigations Branch informed that the 902nd/plan of action is approved with following exceptions: [] requested

and [] estimated cost of [] first year and [] subsequent years seems excessive and justification requested; target date of 1 March 1961 changed to []

BACKGROUND: By Security Division DF, dtd 8 Mar 60, Subject: "Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Espionage Operations". Investigations Branch was requested/

June or early July 1960, Major [] 902nd CIC Ex, informally coordinated with Lt Col [] in late

[] In August 1960, a second plan was forwarded to CIB which proposed the hiring of a civilian; this plan was rejected as being unacceptable. On 22 Aug, Investigations Branch agreed to forward a plan using Army personnel.

RATIONALE: []

adequate, [] seems excessive to [] Cost: [] minus [] seems

Correspondence initially forwarded to Ch, Scty Div by transmitting DF.

AO Time: 3 hours
Typing time: 1 hour

Act Off []
Sec Ch []
Br Ch []
Div Ch []

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RECORD SECTION COPY
Counterintelligence Br

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JUL 28 1965

ACSI-SC

1224788

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ATTENTION: [] (b)(7)(C) FB I - 2-35

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ATTENTION: [] (b)(3) CIA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ATTENTION: Mr Thomas Davis

1224789

SUBJECT: [] (u)

1. (S) Request this office be furnished any available information which may assist in determining the true identity of []
2. (S) The following biographic data is known to this office:

a. [] reportedly a Communist international courier, was born [] as Gultanjian H. G. G. His parents, [] Armenian extraction, are: Father—Gultanjian Hiran; Mother—Arian Hiran Gultanjian. [] is known to have used the following names: []

b. [] reportedly fled Turkey in 1924 as a result of the persecution of Armenians and settled in Marseilles, France. In 1938, went to Spain where, under an unknown name, he served in the Spanish Republican Army as either a soldier or as a "Salvation Army nurse". In 1939, he obtained a false passport using the name [] and posing as a Spanish national, then traveled to Mexico as a refugee. Arriving in Tijuana, Mexico (date undetermined) he became a flower vendor. On 14 November 1944, [] using a false Spanish birth certificate and passport, obtained a visa from the US Consulate in Tijuana and moved to Los Angeles, California. On 1 March 1945, he had his name changed from [] to [] It has been confirmed that [] is the brother of millionaire []

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ON 4 MAY 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOIRA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5300.1R

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G-2 REGISTRY
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6-476-8 p 859

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DISPATCH SECTION
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Counterintelligence BR

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ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Anthony Miran PRINCE (U)

c. PRINCE is described as a Caucasian, male, 5'2", 150 lbs, brown eyes, black hair, and fingerprint classification 5 5 9 LT ..
5 1 UN 2

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 4 May 2008
BY USAINSCOM FOL/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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2

~~SECRET~~

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p49
ACSI-SC

MEMO FOR RECORD: (3 Aug 60)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(6)

SUBJECT: [] U)

CURRENT: G2, Sixth Army requests information on [] reported Communist international courier. Instant correspondence requests FBI, CIA, and State furnish available information to assist in determining the true identity of []

BACKGROUND: Sixth Army program of study on "Soviet Bloc Mexico-based operations against SWUS". [] was first reported as [] by Sixth Army; National agencies checks were negative.

STATUS: Pending

RATIONALE: US Sixth Army submitted additional information which may aid the above agencies in identifying [] Info from FBI, CIA, and State may aid Sixth Army in their program.

DELAY: None

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None

COORDINATION: None

Action Officer Time: 1 hr

Typist Time: 2 hr

Ch, CIAS

Chief, CI Br

Ch, Sec Div

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 4 MAY 2010
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Anti Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

117

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AUG 3 1960

AUG 5 1960

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: 217 Intelligence Operations (U)

THRU: Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
United States Continental Army Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
Sixth United States Army
Presidio of San Francisco, California

1. (U) Reference paragraph 2a(2), your letter, above subject, dated 1 April 1960.
2. (U) Information available to OACSI concerning four of the individuals and the organization listed in above reference is forwarded as per your request.
3. (U) Files available to OACSI contain no information concerning the following personalities:

a. []
b. []
c. []

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Mar 98
BY CDN CERN/COM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

4. (U) An information copy of this reply is attached for transmission to ACSI, G2, Fourth US Army.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

Sgd DARREL G. COSTELLO
Lt Colonel, GS

For

MORRIS B. MONTGOMERY
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

1 Incl

Blag List of Pers, dtd 28 Jul 60
(S/NR) (U)

118

C-4734

p 852

as furnished:

OUSARAW, Mexico
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS EXCEPT none
BY AUTHORITY OF 4-11-60
DATE 28 July 1960

*all info to AB
5 Aug 60
Hob*

RECORD SECTION COPY
Counterintelligence Br

122C

SUMMARY

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

927
445
ACSI-SC

MEMO FOR RECORD: (28 July 1960)

SECRET

SUBJECT: 217 Intelligence Operations (U)

CURRENT: Instant letter provides G2, Sixth US Army with data available to OACSI on four of the individuals and the one organization listed in paragraph 2a(2) of letter AMGBI-I-2, above subject, dated 1 April 1960. Info copies being forwarded to Fourth US Army and OUSARMA, Mexico.

BACKGROUND: Re AMGBI-I-2, 6th US Army, 1 April 1960, above subject, G2, Sixth US Army provided OACSI with the names and addresses of seven persons and one organization [

] and requested additional data available to OACSI. Matter referred to in para 3, 6th US Army letter, answered by Lt Colonel [] P & O Sec, CI Branch.

RATIONALE: To satisfy Sixth US Army request.

DELAY: Necessitated by extensive files/records checks by national level agencies.

STATUS: Complete

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None

COORDINATION: FBI, [CIA,] Department of State, ONI, CRF, Records Section and Document Library.

Action Officer Time: 7 hr
Typist Time: 6 hr

Action Officer
Ch, CIAS

Chief, CI Br
Ch, Sec Div

119

SECRET

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 4 MAY 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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5USC552 (b) (1)

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Operation SHUTDOWN

18 JUL 1960

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Headquarters, United States Continental Army Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia

(u)

1. Forwarded herewith for your information are copies of Interim Operation Directive for 217 Intelligence Operations to be conducted within Fourth and Sixth United States Armies.

2. (U) The 902d CIC Group has been designated the handling and coordinating agency for these operations. Staff supervision will be exercised by this office.

3. (U) Representatives of the 902d CIC Group will contact your office for the purpose of coordinating the requirements of this directive.

4. (U) Detailed plans for continuing this operation after the interim period are being formulated by this office, and it is expected that copies of these plans will be furnished your office on or about 1 October 1960.

1 Incl
Interim Operation Directive (3 cys)

Encls. not Rec'd
Records Section

(Sgd) Richard Collins
RICHARD COLLINS
Brigadier General, GS
Director of Security, Mapping
and Combat Intelligence

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ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Operation SHUTDOWN

(u) ACSI-SC/Lt Col [

] 78874/clw

MEMO FOR RECORD (8 July 60)

CURRENT: DCSI CONARC provided copies of Interim Operation Directive for 217 Intelligence Operations and informed that representatives of the 902d CIC Group will contact their office for the purpose of coordinating the requirements of this directive.

BACKGROUND: [

RATIONALE: CONARC informed of action being taken to permit continuation of operations against Soviet bloc Mexico-based activities until OACSI plan is implemented.

AO Time: 2 hrs

Typist: $\frac{1}{2}$ hr

121

Act Off

Sec Ch

Br Ch

Div Ch

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For Martin

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6USC552 (b) (1)

6USC552 (b) (6)

ACSI-Se

Operation SHUTDOWN

JUL 18 1960

Chief, Investigations
Branch

Chief, Security Division

Lt Col []/78874/jff

1. (U) Forwarded herewith for your information and necessary action are copies of Interim Operation Directive for 217 Intelligence Operations.
2. (U) This operation is planned for a 90-day period as an interim measure until such time as definite plans can be formulated by your office for operational handling to be assumed by the 902d CIC Group for Security Division, OACSI.
3. (U) It is desired that the CO, 902d CIC Group initiate the necessary action to implement the provisions of this directive and effect the necessary coordination with the DCSI, USCONARC, and the 62s of Fourth and Sixth Armies.
4. [] It is further desired that plans for continuation of this operation after the interim period be submitted not later than 1 September 1960. These plans should include but not be limited to such considerations as the number of personnel to be involved, spaces required in excess of present strength, proposed methods of operation, transportation and communication, and the transfer of qualified personnel to be used as [] It is intended that this operation be carried under [] channels.
5. (u) [] It has been tentatively estimated that approximately [] will be required for the maintenance of this operation for FY 1961. This amount will be made available to the 902d CIC Group by ACSI.

1 Incl
Interim Operation Directive (2 cys)

Sgd DARREL G. COSTELLO
Lt Colonel, GS

For
MORRIS B. MONTGOMERY
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

122

RECORD SECTION COPY
Counterintelligence Br

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separated from classified

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C-4636 p824

~~SECRET~~

9274
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ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Operation SHUTDOWN

(u) ACSI-SC/Lt Col]

]78874/clw

MEMO FOR RECORD (8 July 60) (u)

CURRENT: Investigations Branch requested to have 902d CIC implement an interim operational directive designed to prevent loss of those sources of information which were being recruited by Fourth and Sixth Army prior to a CONARC directive prohibiting such recruitment.

BACKGROUND: [

RATIONALE: Attachment of Fourth and Sixth Army CIC personnel to 902d for 90-day interim period will permit an orderly transfer of these operations from Fourth and Sixth Army control to OACSI control and will further be in consonance with DCSI CONARC requirements.

AO Time: 1 hr

Typist: 1 1/4 hrs

123

RECORD SECTION COPY
Counterintelligence Br

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Act Off

Sec Ch

Br Ch

Div Ch

[Handwritten signatures and initials over the routing slip]
D3ch *[Handwritten signature]*

Request for Funds (U)

Ch, Security Division JUL 18 1960

ACSI-SC/Lt Col [] 178874/clw

Attn: Chief, Programs and Budget Division

1.

2. Existing counterintelligence operations being conducted by Fourth and Sixth Armies to combat the efforts of Soviet Bloc Mexico-based intelligence efforts directed against Army installations in those areas are being discontinued for the reason that they do not fall within the mission and area of jurisdiction of USCONARC. The continuation of this operation has been directed by the ACSI. As an interim measure, six CIC agents from Fourth Army and six from Sixth Army will be assigned on TDY to the 902d CIC Group for 90 days. At the expiration of this period, it is expected that OACSI will have assumed full responsibility for administrative and operational control. The 902d CIC Group has been designated the administrative and operational handling agency for this operation under the staff supervision of the Chief, Security Division.

3. (U) It is requested that these funds be made available to the 9000 CIC Group by 15 July 1960.

MEMO FOR RECORD (8 July 60) ACSI-SC/Lt Col [] 18874/clw

CURRENT: [

BACKGROUND: [

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inclosure

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RECORD SECTION COP
Counterintelligence Br

SGT DARREL G. COSTELLO

Lt Colonel, GS

For ~~MORRIS B.~~ MONTGOMERY
Colonel, GS

Colonel, GS

~~SECRET~~

RATIONALE: Requested funds are necessary for proper conduct of this operation. Amount requested is best estimate of cost of TDY and Confidential Expenditures involved for FY 61. Security Division does not have funds they can allocate for this purpose.

COORDINATION: Col Bogen, Programs and Budget Division, and Mr. [redacted] Budget and Accounting Branch, were consulted on steps necessary to obtain required funds.

AO TIME: 4 hrs

TYPIST: 1 hr

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Mar 98
BY CDR L. C. M. COM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

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Counterintelligence Br.

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Act Off *[Signature]*
Sec Ch *[Signature]*
Br Ch *[Signature]*
Div Ch *[Signature]*
IN Br - JHDK

92758 ✓
ACSI-PBB

SUBJECT: Request for Funds

TO: Ch, Sec Div

FROM: Ch, P&B Div

DATE:

COMMENT NO. 2 (U)
Maj. [redacted] 76441/ar

Your request for funds as outlined in paragraph 1 of basic DF is noted. It is requested that your justification include detailed information as to how the funds will be used.

PAUL L. BOHEN
Colonel, GS
Chief, Programs and
Budget Division

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

Regrade to UNCLASSIFIED
when separated from
basic letter DF. Y M/R

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Request for Funds (U) (18 July 60)

TO Ch, P&B Div

FROM Ch, Sec Div

DATE

JUL 29 1960

COMMENT NO. 3 (U)

ACSI-SC/Lt Col [redacted] 78874/clw

Detailed information requested in Comment 2 above is attached as Inclosure 1.

RECORDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Mar 98
BY CD. [redacted] FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

Sgd DARREL G. COSTELLO
Lt Colonel, GS

For MORRIS E. MONTGOMERY
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

Act Off [redacted]
Sec Ch [redacted]
Br Ch [redacted]
Div Ch [redacted]

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RECORD SECTION COPY
Counterintelligence Br

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inclosure (s). Y M/R

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410.1 Eastern Europe

18 July 60

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5 USC 552 (b) (6)

7754 ✓
SUBJECT: Request for Funds (U)

MEMO FOR RECORD (27 July 60) (S)

ACSI-SC/Lt Col []/78874/clw

CURRENT: P&B Division provided detailed information on fund expenditures.

BACKGROUND: By Sec Div DF to DPPA, Thru DSMCI, dated 18 July 60.
Subject: []

] By Comment 2, P&B Div requested detailed information as to how the funds will be used.

Detailed information was provided by Investigations Branch predicated upon expected expenditures of the 902d CIC Group. Since the project has not advanced sufficiently to provide an experience factor, the figures provided are best estimates predicated upon costs of similar type operations.

RATIONALE: []

127

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RECORD SECTION COPY
Counterintelligence Br

Act Off _____
Sec Ch _____
Br Ch _____
Div Ch _____

John Distell
INSTR - *John*

1313 ADD

- 9/10/1 Eastern Europe

18 July 60

18 Jan 60

(1) (a) 78874/clw

~~SECRET~~

Fourth U.S. Army

1960

Serial No. 271

HEADQUARTERS

FOURTH UNITED STATES ARMY

FORT SAM HOUSTON, TEXAS

Office of the AC of S, G2

IN REPLY REFER TO:

AKADB-S

SUBJECT: Fourth U. S. Army Mexico/U. S. Border Counterintelligence Program (U)

Re Soviet Bloc - Mexico based operations

TO: Brigadier General Richard Collins
Director of Plans, Programs and Security
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.

1. (U) As requested during your last visit to this office, attached for your information are the operational concepts of our border counter-intelligence program.

2. (U) Since this document reflects operational concepts, it may not be as detailed as you will ultimately want. As I have stated before, we do not have agents operating on this program as yet. We are maintaining our close liaison with other agencies in the border area and have an ear to the ground. However, to adequately cover this area and the problems it presents, it is necessary that additional agents be assigned for this specific purpose (i.e., counterespionage and countersabotage) and that resident offices be established in some border towns.

3. (U) Based upon these operational concepts we will later prepare operational plans for the guidance of personnel actively engaged in this program. In all probability the operational plans will be revised, based upon actual operations once they are commenced.

4. ~~SECRET~~

*Recd from
C.I. Br
14 Sep 60
RS*

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*Recd from
Molmen*
ARMAN B. MOLMEN
Lt Col, GS
Counterintelligence Branch
Security Division, OACSI

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AKADB-S

SUBJECT: Fourth U. S. Army Mexico/U. S. Border Counterintelligence
Program (U)

5. ~~(S)~~ In my letter of 31 August 1959 to General Willems, I requested permission for the G2, Sixth U. S. Army and myself to visit the Army Attache, Mexico City. Purpose of these visits was to make the Attache aware of the concern of this office for the problem of border security and our capabilities concerning it. To-date no authority to make these visits has been received. [

REFERRED

1 Incl
As stated

William J. Blythe
WILLIAM J. BLYTHE
Colonel, GS
AC of S, G2

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Fourth U.S. Army

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271

FOURTH US ARMY BORDER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

I

5USC 552 (b) (1)

for FBI

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

1. That US Army installations in the Fourth US Army Area are actual or potential targets of espionage, sabotage and subversion by hostile intelligence agencies. (DASRIN 00/SSC-8/DAS-217)
2. That the Commanding General, Fourth US Army, has primary responsibility for the security of these installations. (Defense Atomic Support Agency; installations are excepted)
3. That the 112th CIC Group, under the staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, is the principal operating agency at the disposal of the Commanding General, Fourth U. S. Army, for the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage, sabotage, or subversion directed against the command.

II

CRITICAL AREA

1. The United States-Mexican border in the Fourth US Army Area has been determined to be a critical operational area for the following reasons:
 - a. The existence of a relatively strong Communist Party element in Mexico and the border areas adjacent to the United States.
 - b. The U.S.S.R. and Soviet-bloc diplomatic membership in Mexico greatly exceeds the number deemed necessary in the normal organization of such a diplomatic mission. It must, therefore, be presumed that the excess personnel are engaged in intelligence activities. Since the U. S. offers far more desirable targets than Mexico, it is further presumed that a considerable degree of this intelligence activity is directed against the U. S.
 - c. The close proximity to the border area of sensitive US Army Installations such as Ft Bliss and White Sands Missile Range.
 - d. The U.S.-Mexican border area offers unlimited opportunity for the conduct of hostile intelligence operations directed from Mexico.

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III

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. In accordance with the foregoing, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Fourth US Army, has directed the following activity by the 112th CIC Group:

a. The assignment of a total of five special agents to key points on the United States-Mexican border in the Fourth US Army Area. These agents will be mature and experienced individuals who possess the necessary language qualification; they will be assigned exclusively to counter-espionage and counter-subversion duties.

b. These agents will:

(1) Establish close liaison with all United States, Federal, state, and local agencies in the border area who exercise control over movements of persons or property across the border. Special emphasis will be placed on liaison with the Border Patrol of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

(2) Establish overt sources in the U.S. and Mexico border areas in clubs, associations, commercial enterprises, and similar groups which may have access to information of counterintelligence interest.

(3) [

]

(4) Establish other overt sources having access to counterintelligence information.

c. The following limitations will be imposed on agent activities:

(1) No activities will be conducted in Mexico by agents in an official status.

(2) [

(3) [

]

IV (S)

COLLATERAL OPERATIONAL MEASURES

1. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Fourth US Army, is conducting an intensified research program aimed at the discovery and evaluation of personalities and organizations of counterintelligence interest.

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2. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Fourth US Army, in coordination with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Sixth US Army, will request through the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army [

j. It is anticipated that this team will be composed of special agents of the 112th and 115th CIC Groups.

3. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Fourth US Army, has initiated a program to indoctrinate Installation Intelligence and S2 personnel to insure the strict enforcement of personnel and information security at all installations in the Fourth US Army Area.

(u)
V [REDACTED]

COLLATERAL ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES

1. The Commanding General, Fourth US Army, has requested from the Commanding General, CONARC, an augmentation of five additional spaces in the authorized strength of the 112th CIC Group. This augmentation is essential for the success of the border program. As an interim measure, agents for this program have been requisitioned from USAINTC against vacancies in spaces intended for personnel security investigations.

2. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Fourth US Army, has initiated action to obtain necessary logistic support for this program. Budget estimates for the Fiscal Year 1961 will include estimated costs of this program.

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ACSI-SC

Soviet Bloc Mexico-Based and Subversive Operations (U)

Chief, 902d

Chief, Sec Div JUN 28 1960

ACSI-SC/Lt Col

J78874/clw

1. (U) References:

- a. DASRIN OO/SSC-8/DAS-217, dated 9 Nov 59.
- b. COMARC letter dated 31 Mar 60, Subj: Soviet Bloc Mexico-Based operations against Southwest US.
- c. Conference, Presidio of San Francisco, California, 26-27 May 60, between representatives of ACSI, DA, DCSI, USCOMARC, ACoFS G2 Sixth Army in the 115th CIC Gp.
- d. Reports of ACSI representative visit to ArmA Mexico and G2's of the Fourth and Sixth Armies.

2. (U) Since August 1959, OACSI has sought to develop an integrated counterintelligence program which would serve to detect and neutralize Mexico-based Soviet bloc espionage and subversive activities directed against Army installations and activities located within CONUS. This OACSI program requires operational liaison and counterintelligence collection activities in both CONUS and Mexico.

3. (U) By reference 1a, COMARC and other pertinent Army elements were requested to report information concerning this OACSI program. By reference 1b, COMARC informed the G2's of Fourth and Sixth Army that aggressive counterintelligence operations outside the continental borders of the United States are not within the purview of headquarters USCOMARC, the XI Armies and MDW, US Army.

4. (U) Since [] are required for the successful implementation of this program, the Counterintelligence Branch, Security Division is preparing an operational plan which will contain a requirement for elements of the 902d CIC Gp to be stationed in the Southwest United States for the purpose of collecting information on Soviet bloc espionage and subversive activities directed against the United States from bases in Mexico.

5. (U) In order to avoid loss of potential informants developed in pursuance of this program by the 112th and 115th CIC prior to the 31 March COMARC letter, reference 1c, it is requested that your office expeditiously determine the feasibility of attaching to the 902d CIC Gp Fourth and Sixth

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RECORD SECTION COPY
Counterintelligence Br

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ACSI-SC

ACSI-SC/LtCol [] 76874/clw

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-Based and Subversive Operations (U)

Army CIC personnel utilized in this operation. A letter is being dispatched to DCSI CONARC requesting comment and/or concurrence to this OACSI proposal. Your office will be informed of the results thereof.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

SIGNED

STANLEY E. WHITMORE
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

MEMO FOR RECORD 27 June 60 (u)

CURRENT: 902d CIC Gp requested to determine feasibility of placing certain Fourth and Sixth Army CIC personnel on TDY status with 902d CIC for 90-day interim period.

BACKGROUND: Since Nov 59, Fourth and Sixth Army CIC have been collecting information concerning Soviet bloc in Mexico. By 31 Mar 60 CONARC letter, DCSI CONARC informed Fourth and Sixth Army that they could not pursue aggressive counterintelligence operations outside CONUS. OACSI is therefore preparing a plan to have 902d conduct these operations for CONARC. In the interim, possible sources developed by Fourth and Sixth Army will be lost if continued contact is not made. It is therefore proposed to attach to 902d not more than six agents each from Fourth and Sixth Army for a 90-day period pending implementation of OACSI plan. This is subject to concurrence of CONARC and Fourth and Sixth Army. Sixth Army has already informally recommended interim plan; DCSI CONARC representatives Colonel Pate and Major [] at previous conferences noted it would probably be necessary to transfer those Fourth and Sixth Army CIC personnel handling this operation to 902d.

RATIONALE: Recommend action will ~~permit~~ *aid determination for the* continuation of operations until OACSI plan is implemented.

AO Time: 5 hrs

Typist: 2 1/2 hrs

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 4 May 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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Sec Ch *[Signature]*
Br Ch *[Signature]*
Div Ch *[Signature]*

C-4562 p 804

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☒

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

b1

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE

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JOINT MESSAGE FORM				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED				
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FROM: ACSI DA WASHDC						C-34-60 is DA IN 5663 DO NOT REPRODUCE <div style="transform: rotate(-30deg); font-weight: bold; font-size: 1.2em;">5 USC 552 (b) (6)</div>		
TO: USARMA MEXICO CITY MEXICO								
UNCLAS DA483984 From ACSI for ARMA. Reference your C-34-60.								
Concur. Will inform you later of Lt Col [] arrival time.								
HANDLE AS CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL MEMO FOR RECORD IS REMOVED <div style="text-align: right; font-weight: bold; font-size: 1.5em;">135</div>						<div style="text-align: center;">MEMO FOR RECORD ATTACHED</div>		
SYMBOL ACSI-SC				SIGNATURE <i>Richard S. Smith</i>				
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required) Lt Col []				TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE RICHARD S. SMITH				
PHONE 56074 NR. 1 NR. OF PAGES 1				Colonel, GS Actg Chief, Security Division				
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACSI-SC/Lt Col [

] 6074/vb

SUBJECT: Cable to USARMA, Mexico re Trip

MEMO FOR RECORD (4 May 60) ~~(S)~~

Current: [

Background: [

Rationale: Reply will permit [] (b)(1) CIA to implement his suggestion.

Coordination, Western Branch Collection Div

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

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Counterintelligence Br

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

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- ☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

- ☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

- ☒ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page (s) 138-139

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION								
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FROM: ACSI DA WASH DC					SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS							
TO: USABIA MEXICO CITY MEXICO												
<p>DA976450 From ACSI for G-2</p> <p>1. During recent visit of Colonel Arturo CORONA Mandioroz to Washington, D. C., General Willem discussed with him the possibility of Soviet Espionage operations being directed against the military forces of Mexico and the United States. Col CORONA agrees such operations plausible and of mutual concern although he had no indication such operations were being conducted. Col CORONA further agreed to an ACSI representative visiting Mexico City to discuss with the Mexican military intelligence chief the Soviet espionage problem and our proposals to check and neutralize such operations if they exist.</p> <p>2. We believe that such a meeting may assist you in your endeavor to exchange information with the Mexican military authorities. Lt Col [] will be the ACSI representative. Should you concur, it is suggested it is accordingly requested that arrangements be made for a meeting between Col [] and the G-2, Mexican Defense Secretariat.</p>					DO NOT REPRODUCE 5 USC 552 (b) (6) 7							
<table border="1"><tr><td>DATE</td><td>2</td><td>TIME</td><td>1050</td></tr><tr><td>MONTH</td><td>MAY</td><td>YEAR</td><td>60</td></tr></table>						DATE	2	TIME	1050	MONTH	MAY	YEAR
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ACSI-SC				<i>Richard S. Smith</i>								
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		976450		RICHARD S. SMITH								
SECRET				Colonel, GS								
				Actg Chief, Security Division								
				RECORD SECTION COPY Counterintelligence Br								

1465 ACSI 710.1 CACUSM CUSAGE 2 11 May 60 C-12 am 60

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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FROM:

ACSI DA WASH DC

Meeting to be under your cognizance. Desirable that meeting be held before Col CORONA's forthcoming reassignment. Request you advise [redacted] and Legal Attache that this meeting will occur.

(b)(1)

CIA

MEMO FOR RECORD (29 Apr 60) [redacted]

Current: [redacted]

DO NOT REPRODUCE

Background: On 20 April 1960, during visit to Washington of Col CORONA, G-2, Mexican Secretariat, General Willems suggested and Col CORONA agreed to a visit by an ACSI representative to Mexico City. Purpose of visit is to provide details concerning Soviet Bloc espionage operations directed against the U. S. Army and means used by the U. S. Army to check and neutralize such operations. [redacted]

(b)(1)

5 USC 552 (b) (3)

CIA

Rationale: [redacted]

Coordination: [redacted]

(b)(1)

5 USC 552 (b) (3)

CIA

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Br Ch [redacted]

Div Ch [redacted]

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INITIALS

ACSI-SC

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173-1

APR 26 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 100-20667

ATTN: [(b)(7)(C) for DB E]

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PLANS, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ATTN: [(b)(3) CIA] 94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ATTN: Mr Milton Crane

(b)(6)

SUBJECT: []

] and []

(u)

Request this office be furnished any available information on the following:

a. Participation of [] (true name undetermined) or [] in the Spanish Civil War.

b. Information which may assist in determining the true identity of []

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

Sgd DARRELL G. COSTELLO
Lt Colonel, GS

For STANLEY E. WHITMORE
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

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Recd from
MTRB
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Counterintelligence Br

910.1 Castelnau

20 Apr 60 (17)

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ACSI-SC

MEMO FOR RECORD: (12 April 1960)

~~SECRET~~

925
p30
SUBJECT: [

] and [

](U)

CURRENT: G2, Sixth Army requests information on [] reported Communist international courier and [] allegedly [] brother. Instant correspondence requests FBI, CIA, and State furnish available information re participation of [] and [] in the Spanish Civil War and info to assist in determining the true identity of []

BACKGROUND: Sixth Army has instituted a program of study on Soviet Bloc Mexico-based operations against SWUS.

STATUS: Pending--Sixth Army is continuing program of study on the problem of Soviet Bloc espionage in the SWUS.

RATIONALE: Info from FBI, [CIA] and State may aid Sixth Army in their program.

DELAY: None

RECORD SECTION MATERIAL: None

COORDINATION: CI Br required that the operational information on the individuals be deleted.

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Lusine
to up to
Lillian
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John G. [Signature]
Ch, CIAS
Ch, P&O Sec
Ch, CI Br
Ch, Sec Div

John

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ON 4 MAY 2000

BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA

Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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Br

~~SECRET~~
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH UNITED STATES ARMY
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2

7 April 1960

IN REPLY REFER TO:

Brigadier General Richard Collins
Director of Security, Mapping and Combat Intelligence
Office, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General Collins:

(U) Reference is made to the following correspondence concerning Mexico-based intelligence operations targeted against U. S. military installations in Southwest CONUS.

a. Your personal letters of 11 July 1959, 14 August 1959, and 14 September 1959. (U)

- b. My message GX 358, 30 July 1960. (U)

c. Message DA 966244, 2 October 1959. (U)

d. DASRIN 00/SSC-8/DAS-217, 9 November 1959. (U)

- e. My message 259 AX 28 January 1960. (U)

- f. Letter, ACSI-SIB, "G-B, JM," 4 February 1960 (U).

g. Message DA 970452, 5 January 1960. (U)

h. My letter, subject: "Development of Possible Source (U)," 1 April 1960 (S).

i. My letter, subject: "217 Intelligence Operations (U)," 1 April 1960.

j. CONARC letter, ATINT-SEC 000.7, 31 March 1960.

k. CONARC message ATINT 30493, 5 April 1960. (U)

Correspondence referenced in subparagraphs e, h, and i, above, were transmitted through IMMUNE channels. (U)

In compliance with instructions from DCSI, USCONARC, references j and k, above, we have entered into a plan of disengagement from aggressive counterintelligence operations devised to detect and neutralize Soviet-bloc espionage and subversive efforts directed from bases in Mexico and targeted against United States military installations and

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ON 2 Mar 98
BY CDR USAF/COM FOL/PO

AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

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Page 1 of 3 pages
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7 April 1960

(b)(1)

[

]

(S) Aside from my personal feelings about taking such action at a time when it is felt that security is becoming effectively preventive rather than passively defensive, as was the case for so many years, there are a number of problem areas which I would like to bring to your attention.

(b)(1)

a. Personnel and Funds. At the present time we have not been faced with any problems. We have made do with what we had on hand and it appeared to be developing with some measure of success. It is felt, however, that if, as Colonel Heckemeyer recommends, we are called on to render administrative support for 902nd CIC operations in [] additional personnel and funds will be required. This, for the most part, because I will have no way of controlling the scope or locale of such operations and will be required to maintain reserve forces of a sort to handle any situation which may arise.

b. Liaison and Sources. A great deal of information now being reported is being developed through liaison contacts rather than controlled sources. In activating this operation, considerable coordination was effected with federal and civil agencies in this army area. As a result, the cooperation now being afforded us is at an all time high. We currently have regular effective contact, at the operational level, with CIA, FBI, INS, Border Patrol, and civil police units along the entire Mexican-Sixth US Army border. No insurmountable problems have arisen and we are now receiving operational information, at no expense, which is considered of great security value. At the present time, the 115th CIC has a total of 15 potential or actual informants on this operation who have already been contacted and are in touch or are under control. Of these 15, only 5 are resident in or must be contacted in Mexico. Such contact has now been ordered terminated. Considerable effort and time has gone into developing these sources, the value of which has yet to be gained. If this operation is to continue, as I strongly feel it should, and operational control is passed to the 902nd CIC Detachment, some arrangement should be made to pass these sources to the 902nd. A list of these sources is attached hereto.]

c. Current Investigations. [

(b)(1)

d. [

]

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04.07.1960

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Page 2 of 3
Copy 1 of 4 copies

7 April 1960

(U) As I indicated to you in our private conversations, this project would have required time and patience to produce results. It is apparent from current reactions that we in Sixth Army, and I specifically, may have gone beyond our depth. It goes without saying that I am rapidly paddling out of the water I have "muddled up" to the safety of dry land.

(U) I was delighted to learn of your nomination for a second star. All of us in Sixth Army G2 offer our congratulations and rejoice in the recognition of an intelligence officer on a promotion list.

Faithfully yours,

(u)

List of Sources (dupe)

W. R. RAINFORD
Colonel, GS
AC of S, G2

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ON 2 May 98
BY CDL/.../FOI/PO
AUTH EATLEY CDS DoD 5200.1-R

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5USC552 (b) (1)

5USC552 (b) (7) (D)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

- ☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 147-148

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S - 15 May 60

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FILE NO.

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT

Hostile Intelligence Utilization of Technical Surveillance Devices (U)

TO

Chief, Investigations Br

FROM

Chief, Security Division

DATE MAR 31 1960

COMMENT NO. 1

Lt Col Molmen/78874/dh

1. (U) It is requested that your office assist Fourth and Sixth Armies in identifying technical monitoring devices used by the Soviet bloc from bases in Mexico for surveillance of Fort Huachuca and other Fourth and Sixth Army installations. To fulfill this requirement, request that your office:

a. Contact Lt Col [] Research & Development Branch, CI/D Division, to determine the various magnitudes of electronic and other emanations occurring in the Fort Huachuca, Arizona area.

b. Predicated upon discussions with Col [], determine which presently known Soviet bloc technical monitoring devices might be used in Mexico and/or the type of equipment which the Soviet bloc might use for this purpose.

c. Predicated upon the results of a and b, above, provide CIAS material necessary to prepare for publication a loose-leaf "handy pocket" guide for distribution to Fourth and Sixth Army counterintelligence personnel. The handy pocket guide will include pictures, descriptions of radar dishes, antennae, and other descriptive data which might assist in identifying Soviet bloc technical monitoring equipment.

2. (S) During November 59, this office informed Collection Division that it was within the capabilities of the Soviet Intelligence Service to employ technical surveillance devices of radar or seismograph type, mounted in northern Mexico and directed against U. S. missile, nuclear and aircraft activities. In Feb 60, Collection Division replied that plans were being formulated and measures would be taken by the appropriate national technical agency to determine if such devices were being used by the Soviets against the U.S. Military (Incl 1).

1 Incl

DF dtd 20 Nov 59

subj: Mexico-based
Sov bloc Espi & Subv
activities directed
against CONUS Armies(U)

1 Incl & Cmt 2 dtd

11 Feb 60 (S)

501-2 Eastern Europe
(9 July 59)

Stanley E. Whitmore

STANLEY E. WHITMORE
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

149

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ON 26 Oct 98
BY ODF USANOCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-3.3 DCD 5200.1R

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REPLACES NME FORM 96, 1 OCT 48, WHICH MAY BE USED

16-48801-3 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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p 478

910.1 Coastal Area
31 Nov 60 - C.I. Form 100

~~SECRET~~

ACSI-SIB (31 Mar 60)

SUBJECT: Hostile Intelligence Utilization of Technical Surveillance Devices (U)
TO Chief, Security Division FROM Chief, Investigations DATE 19 MAY 1960 COMMENT NO 2 (C)
Branch

1. (U) Information requested in paragraph 1a, comment number 1, is not available from Lt Col [] R & D Branch, CI/D Division, ACSI. Other offices contacted with negative results were the Communications-Electronics Division, Office of the Chief, Research and Development; Combat Development Branch, Research and Development Division, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, and the Communications-Electronics Section, SMI Branch, ACSI.

2. (U) (C) Discussions with personnel responsible for Communications-Electronics Security in ASA have indicated that this information can be ascertained by the ASA Operations Center at Fort Huachuca, if the Chief, ASA Attn: AC of S, Development, is formally requested to initiate a project for this purpose. However, attention is invited to the fact that mere compilation of this data is of questionable value unless Electronics Security and Communications Security Surveys are conducted by ASA. Also, the nature of activities at Fort Huachuca is such that the number and type of electronic emitters being tested is constantly changing. Individually, some of these emitters may be unclassified and of no concern. [If, however, these emitters are intercepted and evaluated as a part of overall activities they then become a matter of concern to ASA.]

3. (U) (C)

4. (U) (C) Much of the information requested in paragraph 1b, Comment # 1 is believed to be available from the Collection Signal Analysis Agency, National Security Agency, if that Agency is provided with general data as to frequency and magnitude of signals being emitted from Fort Huachuca.

5. (U) (C) In summary, the information requested in part 1 a, Comment # 1 can be ascertained only by ASA as indicated in par 2 above. [This data must then be provided NSA in a request for that EEI desired by par 1b, comment no. 1, par 6.] It is recommended that this information be requested by the Communications-Electronic Security Section, SMI Branch, which is responsible for formulation of policy guidance and staff supervision for operational aspects of Communications-Electronics Security.

1 Incl
n/c

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Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R

LEE M. MARTIN

Lt Colonel, GS

Chief, Investigations Branch

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ACSI-SC (31 March 60)

SUBJECT: Hostile Intelligence Utilization of Technical Surveillance Devices (U)

TO: Chief, SMI FROM: Chief, Security Division DATE: JUL 8 1960 COMMENT NO. 3
ACSI-SC/Lt Col [] 78874/clw

1. (U) Request your office implement recommendations contained in Paragraph 5, Comment 2, above.

2. (U) Security Branch, OSigO, has been requested to provide information describing, in non-technical language, technical monitoring equipment which might be used by individuals to monitor, in behalf of the Soviets, signals emitted by Fort Huachuca and other Fourth and Sixth Army signal installations.

3. (U) An ONI publication, classified CONFIDENTIAL and concerning a similar subject, distributed to personnel engaged in electronic countermeasures, is attached for your information.

2 Incl
Added 1 Incl
2. ONI 26-21A

for *Stanley E. Whitmore*

STANLEY E. WHITMORE
Colonel, CS
Chief, Security Division

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

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ON 2 Mar 98
BY CD [] FOI/PO
AUTH E.O. 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

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ACSI-SC

**Hostile Intelligence Utilization of Technical
Surveillance Devices (U)**

Chief, Investigations Br Chief, Security Division MAR 31 1960
Lt Col Molmen/78874/dh

1. (C) It is requested that your office assist Fourth and Sixth Armies in identifying technical monitoring devices used by the Soviet bloc from bases in Mexico for surveillance of Fort Huachuca and other Fourth and Sixth Army installations. To fulfill this requirement, request that your office:

a. Contact Lt Col Fred R. Ulrich, Research & Development Branch, CI/D Division, to determine the various magnitudes of electronic and other emanations occurring in the Fort Huachuca, Arizona area.

b. Predicated upon discussions with Col Ulrich, determine which presently known Soviet bloc technical monitoring devices might be used in Mexico and/or the type of equipment which the Soviet bloc might use for this purpose.

c. Predicated upon the results of a and b, above, provide CIAS material necessary to prepare for publication a loose-leaf "handy pocket" guide for distribution to Fourth and Sixth Army counterintelligence personnel. The handy pocket guide will include pictures, descriptions of radar dishes, antennae, and other descriptive data which might assist in identifying Soviet bloc technical monitoring equipment.

2. (S) During November 59, this office informed Collection Division that it was within the capabilities of the Soviet Intelligence Service to employ technical surveillance devices of radar or seismograph type, mounted in northern Mexico and directed against U. S. missile, nuclear and aircraft activities. In Feb 60, Collection Division replied that plans were being formulated and measures would be taken by the appropriate national technical agency to determine if such devices were being used by the Soviets against the U.S. Military (Incl 1).

SIGNED

STANLEY E. WHITMORE
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

1 Incl
EF dtd 20 Nov 59
subj: Mexico-based
Sov bloc Espi & Subv
activities directed
against COMUS Armies(U)
w/1 Incl & Cmt 2 dtd
11 Feb 60 (S)

152

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31 March 60 L1700000

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ACSI-SC (31 March 60)
SUBJECT: Hostile Intelligence Utilization of Technical Surveillance Devices (U)
TO: Chief, SMI FROM: Chief, Security Division DATE: JUL 8 1960 COMMENT NO. 3
ACSI-SC/Lt Col []/78874/clw

1. (U) Request your office implement recommendations contained in Paragraph 5, Comment 2, above.

2. Security Branch, OSigO, has been requested to provide information describing, in non-technical language, technical monitoring equipment which might be used by individuals to monitor, in behalf of the Soviets, signals emitted by Fort Huachuca and other Fourth and Sixth Army signal installations. (b)(6)

3. (U) An ONI publication, classified CONFIDENTIAL and concerning a similar subject, distributed to personnel engaged in electronic countermeasures, is attached for your information.

Sgt BARRELL G. COSTELLO
Lt Colonel GS

For
STANLEY E. WHITMORE
Colonel GS
Chief, Security Division

2 Incl
Added 1 Incl
2. ONI 26-21A

MEMO FOR RECORD (6 July 60)

ACSI-SC/Lt Col []/78874/clw

CURRENT: SMI requested to initiate action necessary to obtain information describing Soviet technical equipment used to monitor signals emitted by signal equipment being tested in US/Mexican border area.

BACKGROUND: By Sec Div DF to Chief, Invest Br, dtd 31 March 60, subject as above, Inv Br was requested to obtain information concerning equipment which might be used to monitor signal corps activities in the Fort Huachuca area. By Comment 2 to this DF, Invest Br outlined plan of action to be accomplished by Communications-Electronic Security Section, SMI Branch, which involves queries to ASA and NSA for necessary information.

RATIONALE: Action to be accomplished by SMI Branch may provide information necessary for publication of a loose-leaf "handy pocket" guide for distribution to Fourth and Sixth Army CI personnel. At the same time, OSigO, by separate DF, is being asked to provide similar information.

AO Time: 8 hrs
Typist: 1/2 hr

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ON 3 Mar 98
BY CDR []/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

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31 Mar 60
LT J. []

J25
7/16
SUBJECT: Hostile Intelligence Utilization of Technical Surveillance Devices(U)

MEMO FOR RECORD: (24 Mar 60)

Current: Investigations Branch requested to provide CIAS material necessary to prepare for publication a loose-leaf "handy pocket guide" which will assist Fourth and Sixth Army personnel in identifying Soviet bloc technical monitoring devices used in the Mexican border area.

Background: As a result of General Collins visit to Sixth Army, he desired that ACSI publish a "handy pocket" guide to cover the following requirement: "What would the Soviets have to have in the way of monitoring equipment to engage in technical surveillance of Fort Huachuca operations from south of the border down Mexico way. We should have prepared something in the way of a collection guide for CIC on this subject for both Four and Six Army. Gen Collins suggested that we start with Lt Col Ulrich to develop what are the various magnitudes of electronic and other emanations from Huachuca. I believe we would have to go on from there to estimate what equipment the Soviets could use in Mexico for this purpose--then would come pictures, descriptions etc---size of radar dishes, antennae, etc, etc. Having all this poop in handy pocket form, or in his head, the Rainford agent could then browse around south of the border looking for it. Could also ask his friends, the Mexican cops, agents, etc., to look for the kind of thing described. Also cover what portable equipment the rascals might set up in or very near Huachuca for tech surveillance--black boxes with fishpoles, etc.

Rationale: Investigations Branch "exercises staff supervision and renders reports of technical surveillance operations in the Pentagon Reservation and elsewhere, as directed," (Par 7, O&F Manual). This function requires that they know Soviet bloc technical surveillance devices. Investigations Branch is therefore qualified to provide CIAS material necessary to meet this handy-pocket guide requirement.

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BY USAINSCOM FOLPA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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Act Off *Molmen*
Sec *Hopper*
Ch *Howes*
Div Ch *Whitman*

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5 USC 552 (b) (6)

ACSI-SC

Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Espionage Operations (U)

Chief, Investigations Br

Chief, Security Div

MAR 8 1960

Lt Col [redacted] 78874/dh

In the accomplishment of this requirement, the following factors will be given primary consideration:

a. Mission.

b. Selection criteria. To increase the probability of a successful operation, it is desired that the individual possess the following qualifications:

(1)

A list of critical military targets for Soviet bloc espionage is attached as Inclosure 1 to this DF.

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

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ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Espionage Operations (U)

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c. [

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d. Coordination. Coordination will be effected by this office with CIA and FBI at the time that operational planning has progressed sufficiently to present a firm proposal to the agencies concerned. Informal coordination has previously been effected on the project with [] CIA liaison officer and [] FBI liaison officer.

(b)(3) CIA

(b)(7)(C) FBI

SIGNED

2 Incl

1. Basic ltr dtd
3 Nov 59, subj:
Fe Ts o St Bc Ke(C)
w/2 Incl (S) m/c & 1st Incl.
2. Cy Sixth Army ltr dtd
20 Nov 59, subj: Prob.
Posed by S.bloc Intel &
Sub act directed fm bases
in Mex against USA in
CONUS(U) w/1 Incl(S) m/c

STANLEY E. WHITMORE
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

156

RECORD SECTION COPY
CONTAINS 1 OF 3

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*C-36
7/26*

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Espionage Operations (U)

MEMO FOR RECORD: (2 Mar 60) (~~SECRET~~)

[

This matter was discussed with General Willems at the last briefing on the subject. He gave general approval to the plan at that time. This D/F will initiate specific operational planning on the part of Investigations Branch.

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Propper
Blowes
Willems

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Counterintelligence Br

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*C-408/
p632*

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1 1,65) ACJ

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ACSL-SC

MAR 1 1960

SUBJECT: Monthly Report, Soviet Bloc Espionage Directed Against Military Activities in the Southwestern United States (S)(u)

TO. United States Army Attache
The American Embassy
Mexico City, Mexico

Sett Eastern Europe

1. (U) Reference is made to paragraph 7, letter, your office, dated 4 December 1959, subject as above.
2. (S)(u) Forwarded is a Brief covering Soviet Intelligence operational techniques which you are authorized to furnish the G2, Mexican Defense Secretariat.
3. (S)(u) Additional items will be forwarded your office at later dates for transmittal to the Mexican Defense Secretariat. Such items will include, when available, known Soviet Bloc activities in the United States directed against Mexico, and general information on known Soviet Bloc Intelligence techniques considered of value to the Mexicans in their effort against Soviet Bloc espionage.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

Sgt DARREL G. COSTELLO
Lt Colonel, GS

For RICHARD S. SMITH
Colonel, GS
Actg Chief, Security Division

1 incl
Brief, subj: Soviet Intelligence,
(U), (S) (in dupe)

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CURRENT: Instant ltr fwd OUSARMA, Mexico a sanitized Brief on Soviet Intell operational techniques and authorizes USARMA, Mexico to transmit it to the G2, Mexican Defense Secretariat.

BACKGROUND: Action indicated above is predicated on instructions contained in CI Branch Project C-6-60 assigned CIAS for implementation.

STATUS: CI Br Proj C-6-60 is a continuing requirement.

RATIONALE: Furnishing of intell info of interest to Mexican Defense Secretariat through OUSARMA, Mexico will establish and increase the effectiveness of operational liaison between OUSARMA, Mexico and Mexican Intell agencies.

DELAY: Suspense date of 19 Jan was extended to ASAP pending approval of release material by CIA per fonecon Lt Col Molmen/Maj Matulis on 28 Jan 60.

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
CIA

(b)(6)

SM:BJ. Concern [unclear] #37

[Handwritten signature]

ODGNCI/OACSI
Lt Col [] x78674

5 February 1960

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Espionage Operations (U)

1. **PROBLEM.**

To detect and neutralize Soviet bloc Mexico-based espionage operations directed against the Fourth and Sixth U. S. Armies.

2. **DISCUSSION.**

3. (U) **COMMENT.**

160

This is a sensitive, difficult operation and, of necessity, will require a considerable period of time to achieve tangible results.

4. (U) **RECOMMENDATION.**

That the above information be noted.

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

(U) (4) 255 CSNS

5-746 REFERRED

1/2/60

1/2/60
3952
Suzanne

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 161-164

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: (26 Jan 60) CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Probable Targets of Soviet Bloc Espionage

CURRENT: The Sixth United States Army has completed the initial stage of their study on industries in their area which are most critical and vulnerable and would satisfy known Soviet Bloc EEI. Instant correspondence forwards to [FBI] and [] the Sixth Army's listing which was extracted from inclosure to Sixth US Army Letter, subject: 217, Intelligence Organizations (U), 6 Jan 1960. Information contained in letter not forwarded to [FBI] and [] since these agencies are aware of information contained therein.

REFERRED

BACKGROUND: Listing of the Military and Industrial Installations in the Fourth area and the Military Installations in the Sixth Army area were forwarded by letter on 28 January 1960. Installations listed were those considered most vulnerable and likely to satisfy Soviet Bloc EEI.

STATUS: Pending. Sixth Army is continuing its study of this situation.

RATIONALE: Lateral exchange of information in furtherance of this program.

DELAY: None

RECORD SECTION MATERIAL: None

COORDINATION: None required

165

Action Officer Donald A. Hines, Lt. Col.
Ch, CIAS R. C. Gargan, Maj.
Ch, P&O Sec James Hopper
Ch, CI Br [Signature]
Ch, Sec Div Coatula

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Captain Horner/hmk/73957/CIAS, CI Br/Sec D

14657 ACISI

JAN 28 1960

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ACSI-SC

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ATTENTION: [(b)(7)(C) FBI]

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS, CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCY AGENCY

ATTENTION: [(b)(3) CIA]

DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE

SUBJECT: Probable Targets of Soviet Bloc Espionage (u)

1. Furnished herewith for information are lists prepared by the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G2, Fourth and Sixth United States Armies, of those installations in respective areas, considered to be most vulnerable and most likely targets of Soviet Bloc espionage. Lists of installations are arranged in their relative order of priority based on the following factors:

- a. Size and Importance.
- b. Vulnerability and accessibility to espionage forces operating across the border between the United States and Mexico.
- c. Criticality of mission with respect to the satisfaction of known Soviet Bloc Intelligence requirements.

2. Installations in Fourth Army Area:

a. Military:

(1) Fort Bliss, Texas

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ON 4 MAY 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

Rec'd from
M. H. B.
29 Jan 60
JS

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Counterintelligence Br

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ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Probable Targets of Soviet Bloc Espionage (u)

- (2) White Sands Missile Range, Las Cruces, New Mexico
- (3) Pontex Ordnance Plant, Amarillo, Texas
- (4) Menzano Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico
- (5) Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico
- (6) Pine Bluff Arsenal, Pine Bluff, Arkansas
- (7) Fort Sam Houston, Texas
- (8) Medina Base, San Antonio, Texas
- (9) Fort Sill, Oklahoma
- (10) Bossier Base, Shreveport, Louisiana
- (11) Red River Arsenal, Texarkana, Texas
- (12) Killeen Base, Killeen, Texas

b. Industrial:

- (1) Douglas Aircraft Company, Fort Bliss, Texas, and White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico
- (2) Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, Fort Bliss, Texas
- (3) Gilfillan Brothers, Inc., Fort Bliss, Texas
- (4) Hughes Aircraft Company, Inc., Fort Bliss, Texas, and White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico
- (5) Western Electric Company, Inc., Fort Bliss, Texas, and White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico

167

2

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ON 2 Mar 98
BY CDR USN/COM FIC
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.

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ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Probable Targets of Soviet Bloc Espionage (C) ^(u)

(6) Raytheon Manufacturing Company, Fort Bliss, Texas,
and Red River Arsenal, Texarkana, Texas

(7) Mason Hanger--Silas Mason Company, Inc., (Fontex
Ordnance), Amarillo, Texas

(8) Thiokol Chemical Corporation, (Lenghorn Division, Long-
horn Ordnance Works), Marshall, Texas

3. Installations in Sixth Army Area:

a. Military:

- (1) Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah
- (2) Fort Huachuca, Arizona
- (3) Camp Hanford, Washington
- (4) Yuma Test Station, Arizona
- (5) Fort Ord, California
- (6) Presidio of San Francisco, California
- (7) Fort Eaker, Sausalito, California
- (8) Fort Lewis, Washington
- (9) Signal Depot, Sacramento, California
- (10) Camp Irwin, California
- (11) Sierra Ordnance Depot, California

b. Industrial: Sixth Army has initiated a program to evaluate and
submit a priority listing of Industrial Installations in Sixth Army area which are
under United States Army security cognizance.

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ON 2 Mar 98
BY CDR [illegible] /PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R


(u)
ACSL-SC

SUBJECT: Probable Targets of Soviet Bloc Espionage (u)

6. Fourth and Sixth Armies are continuing a program regarding problems posed by Soviet Bloc Mexico-based espionage operations directed against installations under United States Army security cognizance located in the Southwestern United States. Additional information developed from the program will be forwarded for your information.

7. Your cooperation in continuing to furnish this Office with information concerning this problem is appreciated.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE SIGNED

STANLEY E. WHITMORE
Colonel
Chief, Intelligence Division

169

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ON 2 Mar 98
BY CDL [illegible] FCI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACSI-SC

MEMO FOR RECORD: (20 Jan 60) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Probable Targets of Soviet Bloc Espionage (C) (u)

CURRENT: Fourth and Sixth US Armies have made studies of the most critical and vulnerable targets in their respective areas which would satisfy known Soviet Bloc EEL. Instant correspondence forwards to FBI, [CIA] and INS the listings from Fourth and Sixth Armies.

BACKGROUND: Fourth and Sixth Armies have reported previously that Soviet Bloc intelligence services were possibly mounting operations against SWUS from bases in Mexico, since the crossing of the Mexican-US border was not too much of a problem.

STATUS: Pending. Fourth and Sixth Armies are continuing their studies of this situation. FBI, INS, and [CIA] may be of assistance in the continuance of this program.

RATIONALE: With assistance from the FBI, [CIA] and INS, Fourth and Sixth Armies may better neutralize any suspected or known Soviet Bloc intelligence operation in this area.

DELAY: None.

RECORD SECTION MATERIAL: None.

COORDINATION: None required.

Action Officer Donald Starna, Capt

Chief, CIAS [Signature]

Chief, CI Branch [Signature]

Chief, Security Div [Signature]

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ON 4 MAY 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOL/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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the name is in (7 pages 57)

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5 USC 552 (b) (5)

ACSI-SC/Maj [] 78874/dh

(ACSI) ACSI

ACSI-SC

JAN 8 1960

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against Southwest United States (U)

**TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
U. S. Continental Army Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia**

1217077 - 4

1217079

1. ~~(U)~~ Forwarded for your information and appropriate action is letter, dated 4 December 1959, Subject: "Monthly Report, Soviet Bloc Espionage Directed Against Military Activities in the Southwestern U. S. ~~(U)~~"
2. ~~(U)~~ Paragraph 6, referenced letter, provides names of Mexican military personalities and unit locations with whom liaison is encouraged. Authority for visits and discussions with the Mexican Armed Forces is contained in ~~new~~ ~~aph~~ 4c, AR 380-25.

REFERRED

4. (U) Information contained in referenced letter is extremely sensitive and will not be disseminated outside Army and will be disseminated within Army on a "need-to-know" basis.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

SIGNED

STANLEY E. WHITMORE
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

1 Incl
a/s (S)

Copies furnished:
Fourth and Sixth
Armies

171
1217078

SEE ATTACHED MEMO FOR RECORD

RECORD SECTION COPY
Counterintelligence Br

~~SECRET~~

Q-3809
2022

fr 3/12 ✓
SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against Southwest United States (U)

MEMO FOR RECORD: (6 Jan 60) (SECRET)

CURRENT: DCSI, CONARC provided [] December report concerning Soviet-bloc Mexico-based espionage operations directed against Southwest United States. Fourth and Sixth Armies provided information reports.

BACKGROUND []

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

RATIONALE

DELAY: Delay due to administrative processing of report from S-letter to reproduction for transmission to CONARC.

Coordinated with SMI, FLC, and Western Branch, Col Div. 5

172

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RECORD SECTION COPY
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REFERRED

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFIC/

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

1960 JAN 7 20 37Z

PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (Check)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION	ROUTINE	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE			
INFO							
FROM: ACSI DA WASH						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
TO:						DO NOT REPRODUCE	
SECRET 1. [REDACTED] 2. [REDACTED] A970570 From ACSI for 62.						91011 91016 5 USC 552 (b) (6) REFERRED	
A - PARAPHRASE NOT CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION - PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL SEE ATTACHED MEMO FOR RECORD EXCEPT PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION BY DATE TIME GROUP PRIOR RECORD SECTION COPY Counterintelligence Br						DATE 9 15 15 MONTH 9 YEAR 60	
SYMBOL ACSI-SC						SIGNATURE Stanley E. Whitmore	
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)						TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE	
PHONE 78874						STANLEY E. WHITMORE	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 970570						Colonel, GS	
						Chief, Security Division	

DD FORM 173
1 MAY 55
2-3810540

REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH IS OBSOLETE FOR ARMY USE.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1955-O-347384

~~SECRET~~

ACSI-SO

78874/dh

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

MEMO FOR RECORD: (6 Jan 60) (~~SECRET~~)

Current: []

Background: []

REFERRED

Information to be provided by OACSI to ARMA. Mexico will concern Soviet bloc espionage techniques.

approve items passed.

5 USC 552 (b) (1) ACSI will for FBI

Rationale: []

In addition, steps being taken by Fourth and Sixth Armies to improve their liaison with the Mexican military on the SW border should result in more effective Mexican-US military coordination on this problem.

Dept of the Army Policy for Disclosure of Classified Information to Foreign Governments (DA-DCMI), dtd 25 Jan 1956, authorizes Intelligence information to SECRET to be disclosed to Mexican Government.

Paragraph 4c, AR 380-25, Authority of Commanding Generals, 21 armies, authorizes visits of members of the Armed Forces of Canada and Mexico to D/A installations or activities in connection with coordination of security matters pertaining to the border.

Delay: []

This necessitates processing by Collection Division and reproduction for dissemination to CONARC and 4th and 6th Armies.

REFERRED

COORDINATION:

FLO W. Jordan per Lt Col & T. D. Rubin X 1, 135
Western Br, Coll Div Ch. J. E. [unclear] X 52931
SMI And P. Muller & Lt Col X 55892

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C-3510
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Page(s) 175-176

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Page(s) 177-181

~~SECRET~~

**HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY CARIBBEAN
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL**

FORT AMADOR, CANAL ZONE

IN REPLY
REFER TO
091.411 (GB)

13 October 1950

C I F I L E

93). 277
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SUBJECT: Soviet Agents in Mexico

**TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C.
ATTN: Chief, Intelligence Division, G2**

1. Reference letter, G2/IWW/ 000.244 Mexico, 29 September 1950, subject, "Soviet Agents in Mexico."

2. No record exists, in this headquarters, of the formation or existence of "Institute of Military Exchange."

3. References on file in this office containing information concerning the five Soviet military personnel, in whom the Federal Bureau of Investigation has expressed an interest, are as follows:

[] BID 3164.0600, R-191-48,
16 June 1948, subject, "Movement of Soviet Couriers."

[] BID 3164.0600, R-358-48,
20 October 1948, subject, "Travel of Soviet Couriers."

[] BID 3164.0600, R-80-49,
5 April 1949, subject, "Travel of Soviet Couriers."

[] BID 3164.0600, R-90-49,
3 May 1949, subject, "Soviet Courier Travel."

[] BID 3164.0600, R-57-50,
10 July 1950, subject, "Travel of Soviet Couriers."

Department of State, OIR Report No. 4384.13D, 1 March 1950, subject, "Members of Military Missions Abroad."

Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 45, G2, United States Forces, Antilles, 12 November 1948.

Letter, Military Intelligence Division, G2, Department of the Army, 3 February 1948, subject, "Soviet Diplomatic Courier List."

5 USC 552a (b) (2)
Per 2114

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BY USAINSCOM POFPA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

182

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16 Sept 50

~~SECRET~~

091.411 (GB)

13 October 1950

SUBJECT: Soviet Agents in Mexico

This information has been received from the Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, or from other agencies who have supplied the same information to the Department of the Army. This office does not have any additional information.

4. Any new information received by this headquarters, concerning these individuals will be forwarded to your division.

R. L. Mabie
R. L. MABIE
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G2

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 3 Mar 98
BY CDR L. G. J. COM FCI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-633 DoD 5200.1-R

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Page(s) 184-192



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.



IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO

FILE NO. _____

Date: September 18, 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C. Attention: Chief, Security and
Training Group

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: []

(Not in R/S)
10-5-50

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USC 552 (b) (1)

for FBI

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Page(s) 199-202

5-2 (5K1)

24 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION:

SUBJECT: Communist Agents of Soviet Russia

The following individuals have been identified as Communist agents of Soviet Russia in Mexico, unless specified as being located elsewhere:

1. Peter MANOULISKY, alias KOLOSKEY, alias "Camarada Pedro". Said to have entered Mexico in 1928 or 1929. Reported a delegate to International Comintern.
2. Leon HAIKIS, alias "Sacomi". Reportedly a Spanish refugee who formerly served as a Secretary in Soviet Legation in Mexico. Also was a personal advisor of Moe. KOLONTAI. Reported a delegate to International Comintern. As Commissariat of G. P. U., he is presently said to be secretary of the group which is forming the Executive Communist of the Comintern, recently re-activated.
3. Peter STRECHER. Reportedly delegate from Great Britain to the International Comintern.
4. BIDELMAN or BIETTELMAN (no first name available). German Jew. Reported a Communist delegate to International Comintern.
5. CHANDLER (first name unavailable). American. Said to have been in jail in United States. Allegedly member of Communist Party of United States. Arrested on crossing border in August 1940. Asterisk. Reported a delegate to International Comintern.
6. URIBE (his first name is believed to be Vicente). Said to be member of Spanish Communist Party and delegate to International Comintern.
7. Juan COMORERA soler. Alleged member of Communist Party of Republic of Catalina and reported to be a delegate to International Comintern.
8. James FORD. American negro. Said to be Member of Communist Party of United States. Asterisk. Reported delegate to International Comintern.

203

Regraded: ~~SECRET~~ By Authority
of ACSI Memo 6-54



Record
from survey
2 Nov 51
175

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
ON 3 May 99
BY GCR/DAI/STC/TPO/PO
AUTH PARA 1-330 LDD 5200.1-R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9. [] Reportedly has very bad reputation in Mexico City. Reported delegate to International Comintern.

10. [redacted] Alleged member of Communist Party of Mexico.
Reported delegate to International Comintern.

11. [] He is said to have been former head of Spanish Communist Party - political police.

12. [] (no first name given). Has criminal reputation in Mexico and is said to be one of Lombardo Toledano's gunmen.

13. [] Mexico's Ambassador to Soviet Union, recently appointed. Said to have been named at personal request of Russian Ambassador.

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ON 3 MAR 98
BY CS/SCAL/PC/ST/CI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

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